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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs and Appellants are Sidney Ewing and Cathie Ewing, 
individually and on behalf of the estate of Rayn Ewing, deceased. The Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) and the State of Utah are the Defendants 
and Appellees. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had original jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j). Jurisdiction was transferred from the 
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question before the Court is if the Utah Savings Statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-2-l 11, allows the re-filing of a complaint within one year of the 
voluntary dismissal of a timely complaint against a governmental entity if the 
time allowed to bring the complaint under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(Utah Code §63G-7-403) had not expired at the time the first complaint was 
voluntarily dismissed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves summary judgment arising out of the interpretation of 
statutes. Therefore, the standard of review is substitution of judgment. Peterson 
v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE BELOW 
The issue was preserved below in the Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed April 7, 2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 65-69). It was 
also preserved in the Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition filed April 16, 
2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 78-82). Finally, it was preserved in the Oral 
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Argument held before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto held on May 29, 2009. 
(Case No. 080925951, R 142). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a tragic automobile accident. On January 21, 2007, 
Rayn Ewing, the daughter of Sydney and Cathie Ewing, was operating a motor 
vehicle traveling eastbound on 1-80 in Parley's Canyon (near the Lamb's Canyon 
area) at approximately Mile Post 137. Rayn Ewing was traveling in the #1 inside 
lane. (Case No. 090902418, R 3). 
At the same time that Rayn Ewing was traveling eastbound on 1-80, 
Suzanne Graser was traveling westbound on 1-80 in the same vicinity. Ms. 
Graser lost control of her vehicle and crossed the open center median and entered 
the eastbound lanes. The Graser vehicle collided with Rayn Ewing's vehicle. As 
a result of this collision, Rayn Ewing suffered serious injuries which ultimately 
resulted in her death. (Case No. 090902418, R 3). 
Sydney and Cathie Ewing brought this action individually and as the 
representatives of the estate of Rayn Ewing against the State of Utah and the 
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). The allegations against the State of 
Utah and UDOT were that the Defendants were negligent in failing to provide a 
center median barrier and otherwise maintain a safe road. (Case No. 090902418, 
Rl-10). 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The date of the accident was January 21, 2007. (Case No. 090902418, R 
3). 
2. Plaintiffs gave notice to the governmental entities as required by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. This notice was given on December 11, 
2007. At no time has any party or court challenged the validity of this 
notice. (Case No. 090902418, R 2). 
3. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Summit County on June 10, 2008. At no 
time has a court or party alleged that this complaint was untimely. 
However, the State did allege that the complaint should have been filed in 
Salt Lake County. (Case No. 080925951, R 59), 
4. Responding to the State's allegation, the action in Summit County was 
dismissed voluntarily on September 4, 2008. No party or court has 
alleged or claimed that this dismissal was on the merits or that it was 
anything other than a procedural response to information from the State 
that venue was improper. (Case No. 080925951, R 59). 
5. Plaintiffs filed a second complaint in Salt Lake County on February 12, 
2009. (Case No. 090902418, R 1). 
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6. The State calculates that under the Governmental Immunities Act, 
ignoring the first complaint, Plaintiffs were required to commence suit no 
later than February 9, 2009. As the second compliant was filed three days 
late, the State maintains that it was barred bv the Governmental 
Immunities Act. (Case No. 080925951, R 56). 
UDOT filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was opposed by the 
Plaintiffs. (Case No. 080925951, R 56-57, 65-69). UDOT replied. (Case No. 
080925951, R 72-75). Supplemental pleadings were filed by both parties. (Case 
No. 080925951, R 78-82, R 88-90). Oral Argument was held before Judge 
Joseph C. Fratto on May 29, 2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 93). Judge Fratto 
granted UDOT's Motion. (Case No. 080925951, R 93). UDOT thereafter 
prepared an order granting summary judgment which was served on June 15, 
2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 101-103). This Appeal followed. (Case No. 
080925951, R 131-132). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal concerns the interplay between the Utah Savings Statute 
(Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11), relevant portions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403), and the Wrongful Death Statute 
(Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-304(2)). Those statutes are set out in the addendum. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Savings Statute is of general application and is the de facto law 
of Utah in the absence of specific legislative intent. The purpose of the 
Governmental Immunity Act is to give notice to the government that a claim will 
be made. That purpose was met when the Plaintiffs gave proper notice to the 
State of Utah and UDOT. The requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-406 to 
file suit within one year was also met by the filing of the first complaint. Once 
those requirements have been met, the general application of the Savings Statute 
should apply. As the Plaintiffs clearly re-filed an action which had not been 
dismissed upon the merits within the time allowed by the Savings Statute, the 
Court erred in dismissing the amended complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The State Focuses on the Wrong Statute 
The State claims that the Savings Statute did not apply because the time 
allowed under the Governmental Immunity Statute to file suit had not expired. 
(Case No. 080925951, R 59-60, 73). The State errs in this position because the 
applicable statute is the statute of limitation on wrongful death, Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-2-304 which provides for a two year period. The fallacy of UDOT's 
position is that it would bar any action after the expiration of the Governmental 
Immunity Act with or without consideration of the Savings Statute. This is in 
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contravention of the plain reading of the Savings Statute and the proper 
construction of the Governmental Immunity Statute. 
Plaintiff begins with an analysis of the requirements of the Immunity 
statute. Under §63G-7-401, a claimant must give notice to the government 
within one year of the incident. This notice is jurisdictional. In other words, if 
proper notice is not given, the District Court may not hear the matter. Patterson 
v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67. P.3d 466. In this case, there is no doubt 
that the jurisdiction of the District Court was properly invoked because notice 
was timely given. The State has never complained of inadequacy of the Notice 
of Claim. (Case No. 090902418, R 2). 
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403(2)(b) requires an action 
to be filed in the District Court within one year. This, however, is not 
jurisdictional. There are two cases in which the Supreme Court denied summary 
judgment in favor of the government as to estoppel of the government to assert 
this limitation. Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp. 522 P.2d 1252(Utah 1974; and 
Rice v. Granite School Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). In any 
event, the statutory requirement was complied with by the filing of a complaint 
on June 10, 2008 which was well within the statutory period alleged to begin to 
run on February 9, 2008. (Case No. 080925951, R 58-64). Thus, in all material 
respects, Plaintiffs complied with the strict terms of the Governmental Immunity 
Statute. 
6 
Further, because §63G-7-403(2)(b) is not jurisdictional, it is not the proper 
statute to trigger the effect of the Savings Statute, §78B-2-l 11. It is beyond 
argument that the voluntary dismissal to correct venue issues in not a failure on 
the merits. The statute thereafter provides that a new action may be commenced 
within one year of the failure, if "the time limited .. .by law., for commencing the 
action has expired." Since §63G-7-403 is not jurisdictional, the proper statute to 
consider is §78B-2-304(2) which provides a two year statute of limitation for 
wrongful death. It is also beyond dispute that the two year statute had expired at 
the time that the second complaint was filed. The relevant question is if the lapse 
of time between the dismissal of the complaint and the running of the wrongful 
death statute of limitations is fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim to come under the 
Savings Statute. 
II. The State Focuses on the Wrong Period of Time 
Although there is authority setting out a requirement that the statutory 
time to file an original complaint must not have expired at the time of the failure 
of the complaint, Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184 
(Utah App. 1993), that authority appears to be misplaced when the facts of this 
case are parsed with respect to the actual words of the statute. Since the two year 
statute of limitations for wrongful death ran no later than January 22, 2009, the 
second complaint filed February 12, 2009 was clearly outside the statute of 
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limitations and within a one year period from the date of dismissal. (Case No. 
080925951, R 65-69). The statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time...or if the plaintiff fails 
in such action or cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the 
time limited either by law or contract shall have expired, the 
plaintiff.. .may commence a new action within one year after the reversal 
or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11 
It is clear that the original action was commenced within due time. It is 
also clear that the cause of action failed not upon the merits. (Case No. 
080925951, R 59). The question is whether or not the language "time limited by 
law shall have expired" refers to the time of the dismissal or the time of 1he filing 
of the second complaint. 
The language "time limited by law" should refer to the time the second 
complaint is filed. It makes no sense to look to the time of the dismissal. This 
view leads to absurd results. If, for example, the dismissal came on the day the 
statute ran, the plaintiff would not be entitled to rely upon either the original 
complaint or the Savings Statute. If, on the other hand, the language refers to the 
time of the second complaint, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed not 
upon the merits, get the benefit of not only the original statute of limitations, but 
the Savings Statute as well. 
The statutory interpretation should follow the legislative intent. There is 
absolutely nothing in the Savings Statute that compels a reading that contradicts 
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the intent of extending the time to file a second complaint when the first has been 
dismissed for reasons other than the merits. As pointed out below, the Savings 
Statute is one of general application and there is nothing in either the Savings 
Statute or the Wrongful Death Statute of limitations which would indicate that 
the legislature wished to limit a second cause of action to instances in which the 
two year statute had already run at the time of dismissal. 
Plaintiffs would read the Savings Statute as follows. The original action 
was filed within the two year statute of limitations. It was dismissed because of a 
dispute as to venue. The statute of limitations for wrongful death ran prior to the 
filing of the second complaint. The time had therefore expired. These facts 
being undisputed, Plaintiffs' second complaint should have been accepted. 
III. Utah Case Law Supports Broad Reading of the Savings Statute 
The Supreme Court discussed the purpose of the Savings Statute in 
Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
In the absence of such a plain expression of intent, we have 
generally read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit as 
establishing only procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be 
cleared rather than absolute bars to suit. For example in {Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980)) we 
permitted a plaintiff to proceed under section 78-12-40 when the 
initial action had been dismissed for failure to serve a "notice of 
intent to commence action" under the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act, section 78-14-8. We conclude that section 57-1-32 [Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-2-l 11] (the Savings Statute) does not permanently bar 
further proceedings anytime some procedural failing results in the 
dismissal of a properly filed complaint. (Italics Added) 
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The Kirkbride language should apply with equal force to the present case. 
The order of the District Court bars further proceedings after a procedural failing 
resulted in the dismissal of a properly filed complaint. This language alone is 
sufficient to reverse the finding of the District Court. 
IV. The Purpose of the Previous Filing was to Give Notice of the Claim 
and Notice was Given 
This Court has considered the purpose of notice to the Defendant provided 
by the initial filing. In C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victim's Reparations, 966 
P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1998), the Court was faced with a situation in which the 
plaintiff filed a timely appeal from an administrative ruling, but did not serve the 
complaint. After dismissal for failure to serve, but within the Savings Statute, a 
second complaint was filed, this Court said: 
When C.P. filed her initial petition, Crime Victims was 
placed on notice that she intended to pursue her claim and thus 
received all the benefit the thirty-day limit conferred on them. 
966P.2d 1226. 
This is in accord with the Supreme Court case of Standard Fed. Sav & 
Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991) which concerned the Savings 
Statute in the context of a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court held that the 
primary purpose of the statute of limitations was satisfied when the foreclosing 
party provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought by filing the 
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action. Even if the State were correct in saying that the appropriate statute is 
the Governmental Immunity Act, this Court has consistently said that the purpose 
of the notice of claim is to inform the government of the nature of the claim. 
Cedar Professional Plaza v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App 36, 131 P.3d 275. 
To refuse to apply the Savings Statute to this case is a violation of the 
consistent learning of the Courts. In this case, there was a proper notice and a 
properly filed complaint. The dismissal was not on the merits. The government 
had the advantage of notice of the death of Plaintiffs' daughter. The government 
also knew that the Plaintiffs intended to pursue the case. The rule that the State 
pursues is one of trickery and not substantive justice. The Savings Statute was 
intended to preserve legitimate causes of action which are dismissed other than 
on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Savings Statute can easily be read to preserve causes dismissed not on 
the merits where time remains under the appropriate statute of limitations. The 
authority holding that the statute must have run at the time of dismissal is 
conclusory. Plaintiffs therefore urge the Court to read the language in light of 
the demonstrative purposes of the statute. Such a reading protects both parties 
because the Plaintiffs have the benefit of the legislative statute while the 
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Defendants are protected by the fact that it has received notice of the claim and 
the intent of Plaintiffs to pursue it. This result is logical and just. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiffs seek to have the District Court's Summary Judgment reversed 
and the District Court instructed to set the matter for trial. 
DATED this r day of October, 2009. 
PARKER & McCONKIE 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Appendix 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar j Code/Constitution j House I Seriate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: [ bo 10 [ 
Utah Code 
Title 78B Judicial Code 
Chapter 2 Statutes of Limitations 
Section 111 Failure of action — Right to commence new action. 
78B-2-111. Failure of action — Right to commence new action. 
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
the action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced under this section only once. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B02jmi00.ZIP 1,806 Bytes 
« Previous Section (78B-2-312) 
Questio_ns/Cpmments | UtahjState Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
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Appendix 2 
Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: IffiilPJ 
Utah Code 
Title 63G General Government 
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
Section 403 Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within 60 
days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
63G-7-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier 
within 60 days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied. 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, the governmental entity or 
its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year 
after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07J)40300.ZIP 1,979 Bytes 
<< Previous Section (6_3GT7_-402) Next Section (63G77z5Ql)_>> 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
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Appendix 3 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-304(2) 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Sectlon: 
Utah Code 
Title 78B Judicial Code 
Chapter 2 Statutes of Limitations 
Section 304 Within two years. 
78B-2-304. Within two years. 
An action may be brought within two years: 
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer for liability incurred during the performance 
of the officer's official duties or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money 
collected upon an execution; 
(2) for recovery of damages for a death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another; 
(3) in causes of action against the state and its employees, for injury to the personal rights of another 
if not otherwise provided by state or federal law; or 
(4) in causes of action against a political subdivision of the state and its employees, for injury to the 
personal rights of another arising after May 1, 2000, if not otherwise provided by state or federal law. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B02_030400.ZIP 1,918 Bytes 
« Previous Section (78B-2-312) 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
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Appendix 4 
Order Granting UDOT'S Motion for 
Summary Judgment against the 
Ewing Plaintiffs 
F 
REED STRINGHAM (4679) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT 
PO Box 140856 
160 East 300 South, 6 t h Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
rstringham@utah. gov 
2009 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY PAGET, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
SIDNEY EWING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
EWING PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 080925951 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") moved for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn Ewing 
("the Ewmg plaintiffs"). The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and the Court 
heard argument on the motion. The Court granted the motion for the reasons stated in its May 
29, 2009 bench opinion. 
It is ordered: 
1. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Ewing Plaintiffs is granted. 
2. The action filed by plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn 
Ewing against defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) is dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
3. This order is certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). There is 
no factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims because the certified claims are 
dismissed based on the Ewing plaintiffs' failure timely to commence their separate, but now 
consolidated, action against UDOT. There is no just reason to delay entry of a final order 
because UDOT's final legal status in the Ewing action need^aot-rem^in indefinite while the 
Paget action is litigated. 
DATED this J_ 
Approved as to Form: 
James McConkie 
Attorney for the Ewing Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the June 1, 2009 a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE EWING PLAINTIFFS 
was served on James McConkie and Bradley Parker, 5664 South Green St., Salt Lake City, UT 
84123. 
I hereby certify that on June 15, 2009, a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE EWING PLAINTIFFS 
was served on the following in the manner indicated: 
By United States mail, first class, postage prepaid: 
David Biggs 
Rachel Sykes 
Attorneys for the Paget Plaintiffs 
5664 S. Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
By hand delivery: 
Barry Lawrence 
Attorney for UDOT as to the Paget Plaintiffs 
160 East 300 South 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Dated this IfTdav of June, 2009. 
REED STRINGHAM 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're gathered here in the 
matter of Timothy Paget and others -- or it's actually 
Sidney Ewing and Kathy Ewing and others versus the 
State of Utah Department of Transportation. It is the 
defendant's -- the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment against the Ewing plaintiffs. 
We've allotted a half an hour. That's 15 
minutes a side. You can use, within the certain 
bounds of good taste and decorum here, that time as 
you wi sh. 
We'll begin with the defendant. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Thank you. 
The Court should grant our motion for 
summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not refile 
their lawsuit within the one-year limitation period. 
That's the simple -- a very simple statement of our 
position in the case. 
Your Honor, I've prepared a sort of cheat 
sheet, or handout, that I think might be helpful, if I 
could approach the bench and give it to you. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. STRINGHAM: I've also given opposing 
counsel a copy of it. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. STRINGHAM: There are no disputed facts 
in this case, and in the handout you can see I've 
given a list of the undisputed material dates. The 
statute of limitations started to run on that first 
date listed there on February 9, 2008. That is when 
the notice of claim is denied. 
The plaintiffs timely filed their lawsuit a 
few months later on June 10th, but that was dismissed 
without prejudice because it was filed in an improper 
venue. 
THE COURT: Is that the reason that it was 
dismissed --
MR. STRINGHAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: — that they filed in --
MR. STRINGHAM: Summit County. 
THE COURT: -- in Summit County? 
MR. STRINGHAM: Yes. Yeah, I -- I filed a 
motion to dismiss for -- for improper venue, and the 
plaintiffs said that they would stipulate to 
dismissal. And so that's how that case was dismissed. 
THE COURT: And I don't want to interrupt 
you, but it does seem like they -- we've come down to 
this, after I've read the briefing, and that is 
whether -- that's why I want to clarify exactly why 
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the -- it was voluntarily dismissed. 
MR. STRINGHAM: It was. 
THE COURT: And that's how it's phrased by 
the plaintiff -- the plaintiffs here, that it was 
voluntarily dismissed. It seems to me that the issue 
is if an action is filed in an incorrect venue or not 
the correct venue and the -- in response to that, that 
realization I suppose, the plaintiffs have opted for 
the -- they opted for the process of voluntarily 
dismissing it and then refiling it. 
Whether that is under 78B-2-111 a failure in 
the action, what -- what is your view of that? 
MR. STRINGHAM: It seems to me, your Honor, 
that the phrase failure of an action means it ends, it 
can no longer go forward. And the statute talks about 
not only failure of an action but failure on a ground 
other than on the merits, which is what happened in 
this case. The action was ended up in Summit County, 
and then it was refiled. It wasn't transferred. And 
so in that sense, I think it failed otherwise than on 
the merits. And so --
THE COURT: So it is a failure, then. 
MR. STRINGHAM: It is a failure on the 
merits. And so the first -- I think that the first 
requirement of that savings statute is probably met. 
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It failed otherwise than on the merits, but it's the 
second requirement that I'm focusing on. In order to 
get the benefit of the savings statute it has to fail 
on the merit -- otherwise than on the merits within 
the applicable statute of limitations period -- or, 
excuse me, beyond the applicable statute of 
limitations period. 
And if you look at the dates here on this 
handout I've given you, the -- the case was dismissed. 
In other words, it failed not on the merits on 
September 4, 2008, when it was dismissed without 
prejudice. So in other words, they still had five 
months to file the lawsuit. 
The savings statute deals with the unfair 
situation in which a -- a lawsuit gets dismissed not 
on the merits but the statute of limitations has 
already expired. And in that case you can see why the 
legislature would say, okay, you're going to have 
another year. 
But in this case, we don't have those facts. 
The plaintiffs had another five months and they didn't 
file. Now, interestingly, the Pagets, who -- who were 
also involved in this lawsuit did file within that 
year period. They filed in December. 
So I think according to the plain language 
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of that statute, it simply does not apply and doesn't 
help the plaintiffs at all 
Setting that statute aside, then, all we 
have is the one-year limitation period 
THE COURT Let me ask you, though 
MR STRINGHAM Okay 
THE COURT If they had filed by — the 
nature of the dismissal is a failure under the -- see, 
the statute uses an interesting -- fails, the action 
fails And then you get, do you not, one year from 
that dismissal 7 
MR STRINGHAM If the failure occurs after 
the original statute of limitations has expired, and 
we don't have that here The plaintiffs still had 
another five months to file that lawsuit They were 
still within that original one-year period of time 
THE COURT So your position is that there 
was a -- if they had filed within the -- within the 
time period by -- before February the 9th of this --
of this year, then they would have been fine 
MR STRINGHAM Yes, yes 
THE COURT But their mistake is, if you 
will, that they -- they dismissed the matter within 
the first period of time, and thus were obligated to 
refile within the -- the one-year limitation -- or the 
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l im i t a t i o n per iod. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Exactly. 
THE COURT: But if they had waited, if they 
had waited until after February the 9th, 2009, to 
voluntarily dismiss it because it was -- had been 
filed in the wrong venue --
MR. STRINGHAM: Well --
THE COURT: -- then they would have been 
fine? 
MR. STRINGHAM: Well, I -- I -- I don't know 
that they could have waited because I filed a motion 
to dismiss back in -- back in June of 2008. And so 
we -- and I filed a motion, and I got a call from 
plaintiffs' counsel and he said, We'll dismiss it and 
then we'll refile in Salt Lake County. And so that 
was the -- that was the stipulation that we had, and 
then the judge signed the order on September 4th. So 
I don't think it was a matter of waiting. It was we 
had -- we had a motion to dismiss pending, and they 
agreed to dismiss it. 
I -- I think, your Honor, that you 
understand our position so I won't take any more of 
the Court's time unless you have any other questions. 
THE COURT: No, I think I -- you have 
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clarified that. Thank you. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker? 
MR. PARKER: Thank you, your Honor. 
It might be helpful just for the purposes of 
better understanding the dates for me to just give a 
little background on this. This case was initially 
filed by another firm, and that -- and so the question 
that occurred to me as it was being argued was: Well, 
if we had agreed to dismiss it, why did we wait for 
five months -- or more than five months to file the 
complai nt? 
And to be honest -- and this is not my case, 
it's my partner, Mr. McConkie's. This has given him 
significant distress, and for that purpose he's asked 
me to argue it. But he received this case about two 
weeks before it was filed and looked at it, I believe 
figured we had the one-year savings statute and filed 
it. It looks like it was filed a few days after what 
the State claims is the running of that statute. 
And I'm not saying that that two-week period 
is a period. We accepted that case and took 
responsibility for that, and it's our responsibility. 
But the -- the time of the filing came about in that 
way. 
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We essentially, I believe -- and I believe 
Counsel has indicated correctly, that the nub of this 
hangs on that part of the statute which indicates, and 
the time "by law or contract for commencing an action 
has expired." If -- if -- interestingly, if this case 
had not been dismissed until after the time from the 
notice had expired and had then been dismissed, we 
clearly would have had another year. 
And hence our argument that we made in our 
supplemental brief that the reason for the notice 
statute is to do just that, is to give notice so that 
the government has a chance to have notice before it 
actually deals with the -- the nitty-gritty of -- or 
it -- as the matter is commenced. It can think about 
it before the complaint is actually filed and decide 
whether to try and settle it or the like. 
In this case, we had not looked specifically 
at the word failure, although that's one that, your 
Honor having raised that, I'm sure we'll go back and 
take a look at that. But we have looked at the 
wording --
THE COURT: I don't mean to interrupt you, 
but as I understand Mr. Stringham, he sort of concedes 
that point, that what happened here was a failure --
your briefing sort of emphasized that it was 
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voluntary 
MR PARKER Right it was voluntary 
THE COURT And of course the statute talks 
in terms not of voluntary dismissal but of a failure 
And, in fact, are not the examples -- or at least some 
that I'm aware of, are not -- there's no voluntary 
dismissal -- what's happened here is -- for example, a 
summons was not served on time so the Court dismisses 
the action as determined to be a failure 
MR PARKER And on one there was a 
dismissal on the merits In the case where -- what we 
claim is the dicta that says, look, it has to be 
within this -- if you dismiss before that period is 
run, you better file within that period because the 
statute doesn't apply That case we believe was 
dismissed on the merits And -- and so that dicta 
suggests that it has to be filed in that case 
But in this case, this was really just a 
procedural thing where it's, oops, okay, we filed in 
the wrong venue -- or initial counsel -- it would be 
better to file it in the Third Judicial District, 
we'll do that That case was transferred to us and we 
filed And the question is, had we filed two days 
earlier or three days earlier, then it would have been 
okay But in this case it would not have 
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Let me just respond to that with -- in the 
following ways. And the first way I would respond to 
that is by asking what is the purpose of the notice 
statute to the government here. And we've cited for 
your Honor in our supplemental brief the Supreme Court 
case that talks about the purposes of such statutes, 
and that case indicates that the purpose of those 
statutes -- and I'm citing from Standard Federal 
Savings & Loan versus Kirkbride, a Utah Supreme Court 
case that's cited, where the Court says that the 
sensible view of -- of looking at the purpose of these 
types of statutes is that the purpose is satisfied 
when in this case the foreclosing party provided 
notice. And it gives the governmental opportunity --
or entity an opportunity to conduct an inquiry. 
And so the purpose really is a notice 
purpose, and indeed the State had notice here. And 
the purpose of the statute is not to foreclose 
generally the rights of a party on procedural grounds 
otherwise to commence and proceed with a cause of 
acti on . 
Interestingly, the construction that the 
State urges upon the Court is a construction that --
that almost argues against judicial efficiency. It 
says, well, if you just delay and wait until that time 
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period is run, and so you spread out the litigation a 
little longer, and then refile -- dismiss and refile 
then you re just fine By being a little more 
expeditious and cooperative in this case you ve --
the State claims that we've placed ourselves in a 
position of jeopardy 
I would like to offer even an additional 
argument that I believe is helpful And that is, in 
looking at the text of the statute that's referred 
to -- and this is the savings clause statute -- the 
words that we have focused on are, and the time 
limit -- "time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the action has expired " 
And I would like to just concentrate for a 
moment on commence and what it means to commence an 
action If I file an action against a -- if I wish to 
litigate against a nongovernmental entity, and it s 
not a physician or there aren't -- there aren't other 
notice requirements, but I -- I'm litigating against 
my neighbor for putting a fence on my property, then I 
might initiate that claim by filing a complaint How 
do I commence the claim7 I might commence the claim 
by filing the complaint 
The -- there's a Supreme Court case that 
suggests that an action is commenced by having a 
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summons served. And so this word commence is subject 
to different interpretation. What does commence mean? 
Commence means initiate, begin. And so do you begin a 
complaint by -- do you begin a claim by filing the 
complaint? Do you begin the claim by having the 
summons served? Is that how it's commenced? 
In certain instances where notice is 
required of a governmental entity, the way that you 
commence by law a matter is by giving notice. And so 
you have to come in and give a notice of a claim. And 
you don't always commence by filing a complaint. In a 
probate matter you may file a petition. In matters 
that come before the Supreme Court that are filed 
before administrative bodies, that is -- those are 
commenced in -- in different ways, not by complaint or 
by summons before the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, for 
example. 
And so this statute talks about -- and we 
believe that the purpose of the statute is to indicate 
that if you commence an action and then it's somehow 
dismissed on -- not on the merits, you may -- you may 
in this case commence a new action within -- within a 
year. 
THE COURT: Well, may I ask this, then? 
You -- the -- and this would be jurisdiction, of 
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course, because this is a question of -- is it not, of 
a statute of limitations7 If you don't fall within 
the statute of limitations, the Court has no 
jurisdiction of the matter 
But -- I guess my question really is What 
period of time do you think you have, then, one year 
from the -- the order of dismissal which would have 
been September 4, 2008? When would the -- well, let 
me ask this first You had a year, you think, to 
refile? 
MR PARKER I guess what -- what the gist 
of our argument is that this provision here is --
is -- it could have said from the filing of a 
complaint So the legislature clearly should have 
said if you're -- if you're dismissed, there's a 
dismissal of your complaint, you have to file your 
complaint within the year But it does not It uses 
a much more broad and vague term, and a term that's 
used rather loosey-goosey in the -- in the body of 
law, the case law that speaks about the commencing of 
an action 
And so our point here is, is that the --
what the -- this maybe gives a hint as to what the 
legislature intended, and that is the legislature 
intended that if you file a -- if you initiate an 
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action and if that action is terminated for some 
reason other than on the merits, for example, it's --
it's dismissed without prejudice, that you then have 
an additional year. That really --
THE COURT: But from what date, though? I 
guess that's my question. What -- it's a year period 
to refile. It's not -- but from what date would 
that --
MR. PARKER: It's from the date of 
dismissal. So if I -- if our complaint is dismissed 
on January 1, 2009, I have until December 31, 2009, to 
refile the complaint. 
THE COURT: And in terms of the statute, the 
savings statute, what language or is there other 
authority that supports that conclusion that it's a 
year from, in this case, September the 4th, 2008? 
MR. PARKER: Well, it -- what — the 
language is within the year after the reversal or 
failure. So this is any action that is "timely filed 
and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or the 
plaintiff fails in the action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than on the merits." So we say this 
was timely filed, and we have failed -- and you've 
caused me to wonder if we really have failed, but 
let's assume for a moment that we have -- and we 
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failed for a purpose -- failed otherwise than on the 
merits, then we may file again within one year after 
the reversal or failure And so that one year would 
be within one year from September 4 2008 And we 
filed on February 12, 2009 It's clearly within the 
one year -- within the one-year period 
I maybe even confused myself and possibly 
the Court, but -- but if we -- if we take out the one 
line, "And the time limited by law or contract for 
commencing the action has expired," and you take that 
out of the statute -- and I'm looking at page 2 of 
the -- of the -- of the State's -- well, I guess of 
our supplemental -- no, it's page 2 of the State's 
second brief that cites the statute 
Then it says if you file a cause of action 
and it's dismissed or it fails for a reason other than 
in -- than on the merits, then you can refile within a 
year That's essentially what that says So it -- it 
saves you and gives you some additional time The 
State's claim is, yes, that's the case except if you 
file -- if you dismiss it prematurely and so you don't 
let the statute run, if you will Then, 
interestingly, you're not saved, you by -- by 
dismissing it prematurely you're pulled back into the 
original statute and your case fails That -- that's 
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essentially the claim of the State, as I understand 
it. 
Our argument is that's not what the 
legislature intended. The legislature said, look, if 
you file timely and something happens that's not on 
the merits -- the judge hasn't said I'm dismissing it 
on the merits, a jury hasn't decided it on the merits, 
if it fails for another reason like voluntary 
dismissal -- then we're going to give you an extra 
year of time. That's clearly the intent of what the 
legi stature i ntended . 
The State is trying to say, well, that is 
qualified by this one little language that talks about 
the commencing of the action. 
And our claim is, well, how do you commence 
an action against the State? You commence that by 
giving notice. And so one way we'd respond to the 
defense of this is to say you can -- you can defend --
we can't proceed against State without giving notice. 
That's -- how do you initiate a claim against the 
State? You have to give notice. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker, I'm going to stop 
you there. Your time is expired. I think I do 
understand your position. 
MR. PARKER: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. PARKER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stringham? 
MR. STRINGHAM: The statute speaks of 
commencing an action. An action is a lawsuit. It's 
not a prerequisite to a lawsuit, which is filing a 
notice of claim. 
THE COURT: May I ask this? If 
Mr. Parker -- I mean, if that's the interpretation to 
give it -- I give it that interpretation, that is, 
commencing means the notice, beginning with the 
notice, then what effect does that have in terms of --
I'm trying to listen and sort of calculate that 
myself, but I don't -- what effect would that have in 
terms of the timing here? If commencing an action in 
this context meant filing the notice, giving the 
notice that's required --
MR. STRINGHAM: Well, the --
THE COURT: -- what effect would that have? 
MR. STRINGHAM: The notice of claim was 
filed December 11, 2007. So if you say that 
commencing an action means filing a notice of claim, 
the lawsuit was -- let's see. The lawsuit was 
dismissed on June 10, 2008. So that was within a year 
after the notice of claim was filed; in other words, a 
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year within the time that the action was commenced, if 
you want to say filing a notice of claim means 
commencing an action. 
And so the lawsuit in this case would still 
be untimely, if that's what it means, because you 
would have one year from the time of filing the notice 
of claim. 
MR. PARKER: I think he's right, your Honor. 
For all the creative possibility in our argument in 
looking at that, I think the notice of intent -- or 
the notice of claim was filed on December 11, 2007. 
MR. 5TRINGHAM: So the --
THE COURT: Well, I just wanted to see what 
effect that would have, and it's -- the argument 
remains the same. 
MR. 5TRINGHAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: It was not filed. It was not --
it was dismissed and not refiled within the one 
year --
MR. STRINGHAM: From filing the notice of 
claim 
THE COURT: — limitation. 
MR. STRINGHAM: -- yes. 
THE COURT: Well, what is meant by -- I 
guess one thing that I -- sort of troubling just 
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conceptually and that is if a matter was dismissed, a 
failure -- if a matter failed a day before the year 
period, is that -- then that would mean that you were 
obligated to refile within that -- that period 
MR STRINGHAM That's a much harder case 
You're right, that is a much harder case But we --
we had five months in this case And so we're not --
we don't have those kind of equities tugging at us to 
say, well, maybe -- maybe this should be a different 
result here 
The -- I think you have to give effect to 
the plain language of that phrase, "In the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
action has expired " You can't ignore that It's in 
the statute, and it requires that the -- in order to 
get benefit of the statute, the dismissal without 
prejudice has to occur after the statute of 
limitations has expired 
If you step back from that and look at what 
the purpose of that statute would be, it makes a lot 
of sense The legislature is saying okay if 
somebody's timely filed a lawsuit, they've done what 
they're supposed to do but for whatever reason it 
fails but it doesn t fail on the merits and the 
statute of limitations is expired then they 
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couldn't -- you could make an argument that you can't 
refile if it faiIs 
But the legislature said, well, in that case 
if the statute of limitations has expired and it 
hasn't failed on the merits, we're going to give those 
people another year And that's, I think, the 
fairness that comes into play with the statute 
If -- to accept the plaintiffs' argument, I 
think, would be to gut the -- the notice -- or, excuse 
me, the one-year statute of limitations provision in 
the Immunity Act that says you have to file within a 
year after the notice of claim is denied 
I would remind the Court of the Hansen case 
In that case, the plaintiffs did file a notice of 
claim, but the Court still held that the cause of 
action that was dismissed without prejudice was 
untimely -- or, excuse me, it wasn't covered by the 
savings statute because the dismissal had been within 
the original two-year limitation period in that case 
And then I would also remind the Court of 
the Harward case in which a plaintiff with a claim 
against a government agency filed the lawsuit one day 
beyond the statute of limitations period And in that 
case the trial court and the Supreme Court held that 
the lawsuit was barred 
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I think I've -- I've taken up enough of the 
Court's time on this unless you have any more 
questi ons. 
THE COURT: No, I think I understand your 
posi ti on. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I appreciate everyone's argument 
and their briefing on the matter. I think I'm 
prepared to give you a ruling. 
This is a statute of limitations. The 
question is whether the Court has jurisdiction. In 
order to reach the result Mr. Parker urges, I would 
have to essentially, I believe, ignore the language 
that we focused in here on and that is: "And the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
action has expired," either by way of filing a 
complaint or even commencing the action. If 
commencing meant just filing the notice, the action 
was not filed within that year -- within the year 
period . 
And I must say, I have to give a reasonable 
interpretation, but I think there's support in the 
cases that Mr. Stringham has cited that this language 
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does have meaning, and it means that if the action 
is -- fails within the time period, that you have the 
remainder of the time period to refile If it fails 
beyond the time period, and I think this is similar to 
other statute of limitations, it then adds another 
year to the statute of limitations, because by 
definition if it fails after the time period, then 
you're out of time So a failure would be 
meaningless It would have the same effect as if it 
were dismissed on the merits, if you will, and that 
is, you couldn't refile if time had expired 
So it seems in giving the effect of this 
language and also the sort of logic of it if you 
will -- and that is, you must file within the time 
period if it fails within the time period If it 
fails outside of the time period, you're given another 
year to file 
Consequently, and for all those reasons, the 
defendant's motion is granted 
Mr Stringham, if you'll draw an order that 
reflects this ruling 
MR STRINGHAM I will, your Honor 
THE COURT Thank you 
Mr Parker7 
MR PARKER Your Honor, I failed to 
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introduce Counsel who's sitting here with me, Rachel 
Sykes. Rachel just passed the bar this last year. 
MS. SYKES: Two years ago. 
MR. PARKER: Two years ago, I'm sorry. She 
has a father who you've probably seen in this court 
before. But I failed to introduce her, and I 
apologize for that. I just wanted to correct that 
oversi ght. 
THE COURT: The tradition continues. Nice 
to have you in the courtroom. 
MS, SYKES: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Again, thank you for your 
argument and your briefing on the matter. 
MR. PARKER: Thank you, your Honor. 
(End of proceed!ngs.) 
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